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1. SUMMARY: Whether the operation of a state-owned railroad 
is a traditional and integral governmental function, within the 
meaning of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833, and 
therefore constitutionally shielded from the provisions of the 




2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp is a rail commQn carrier 
serving five counties within the metropolitan New York city area. 
Resp was acquired by New York State in 1966 and carries ..... .. ............_,.., 
approximately 250,000 passengers each weekday. Petr is one of 
seven collective bargaining representatives for resp's operating 
and train employees. Beginning in 1979, petr brought suits 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the relationship between the 
parties was governed by the Railway Labor Act, 45 u.s. § 151 et 
~· which permits strikes by covered employees and that the 
employees could thus not be subjected to the sanctions of New -
York's Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Cir. Law § 200-214, which prohibited 
strikes by public employees. 
Following much procedural pestering, the DC eventually found 
that resp was a "carrier" engaged in interstate transportation 
and therefore subject to the Railway Labor Act. It also 
concluded that the federal scheme preempts the state from 
regulating the labor relations of the railroad employees. 
The CA 2 reversed. It agreed that resp is subject to the 
literal terms of the RLA, that it is a "carrier". Relying on 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), it 
nonetheless held that application of the RLA to resp is not 
within the authority granted to Congress under the Commerce 
Clause. In reaching that result, the CA 2 relied primarily on 
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. It first concluded that 
the State's operation of a passenger rail service, as 
distinguished from a freight service, to be an "integral 
governmental function". It is a service that the state and local 
- 3 -
governments are particularly suited to provide because of the 
community wide need and it is a service that they have come to 
provide because economic consideration have eliminated most 
private suppliers. The CA thus distinguished United States v. 
California, 297 u.s. 175 (1936) which concluded that a state's 
operation of a freight service wa~ not an integral part of their 
governmental activities. The CA then held that the RLA displaces 
"essential governmental decisions", namely, the ability of the 
state to structure its employer-employee relationships. Not only 
is the particular activity involved here essential to the public, 
it is also essential that the government step in to furnish it. 
Turning to Justice Blackmun's balancing test, the CA 
concluded that there was no demonstrably greater federal interest 
which overrides the State's interests. First, the objectives of 
the RLA are consistent with those of the Taylor Law, to provide 
an orderly method of dispute resolution and to ensure continuous 
service. The Taylor Law seeks to further that purpose, thereby 
helping the resp to maintain its status as a "vital link" in the 
flow of interstate commerce. Second, the state has a far greater 
interest in dispute resolution related to resp than does the 
federal government. The federal interest in preserving the right 
of resp's employees to strike is not "demonstrably greater" than 
New York State's interest in preventing strikes. Strikes by 
resp's employees must be discouraged so as to ensure continuous 
passenger service for so many daily commuters. The CA 
distinguished Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 
- 4 -
u.s. 389 on the grounds that Usery did not control there because 
of the presumption against implied repeals of the antitrust laws. 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) The decision below conflicts with such 
cases as California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553; United States v. 
California, 295 u.s. 175, and Pardon v. Terminal R. Co., 377 u.s. 
184. Those cases upheld the application of federal railroad 
legislation, including the RLA, to the operations of state-owned 
common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. Indeed, in 
Usery,_this Court expressly asserted that the decision of United 
States v. California was not inconsistent with its decision. 383 
U.S., at 854, n. 18. In sum, theCA has misapplied Usery. It 
has substituted the Usery test of "traditionality" and 
"integrability" for an "essentiality" test, with "essentiality" 
,, to be gauged not only in terms of the nature of the public 
service, but also its availability in the marketplace. In 
broadening the scope of Usery to include a state operated 
interstate freight/commuter railroad, the CA deviates from a line 
of decisions which had properly given narrow construction to 
Usery. 
(2) The RLA does not displace the state's power to make 
"essential governmental decisions". Cf. Pearce v. Witchita 
County, 590 F.2d 128 (CA 5) (Congress may constitutionally impose 
the provisions of the Equal Pay Act on state employers). The RLA 
does not impose federal standards on the decisions the State must 
make with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 
It simply requires the State to bargain collectively with petrs. 
The RLA is not directed to the States, but to the operation of 
interstate railroads. 
(3) Nor does the State have a greater interest in dispute 
resolution than the federal government. The Taylor Law is simply 
ineffective. Since its enactment there have been close to 300 
strikes by public employees. Nor do these stoppages have a 
devastating economic effect on the community. Nor is there any 
support for the CA's proposition that the provision of passenger 
transportation has "to be supplied primarily by state and local 
governments." 
Resp asser~s that the decision below fully conforms to the 
holding in National League of Cities. Surely when the federal 
government instructs a State that it must permit its employees to 
strike to enforce their wage demands, there has been as much an 
abrogation of the State's otherwise plenary authority to 
structure its relationship with its employees as there was in 
National League of Cities. The CA properly included public 
transit within the National League of Cities doctrine. Surely a 
transit system such as resp's, which transports 250,000 people 
each day, is providing an integral public service. As to petr's 
emphasis on the word "traditional", the provision of public 
transit by the state is not an new phenomenon. In any event, 
transit has changed and it is more a public service than ever 
before. Even if not quite "traditional" the provision of the 
service is certainly integral. The railroad cases cites by petr 
are irrelevant. Freight railroading in the United States--as 
opposed to local passenger railroading--is still a private sector 
- 6 -
function. All the cases cited by petr are concerned with freight 
railroading. 
4. DISCUSSION: The issue is important. In my view, the CA 
made a reasonable effort to apply the principles announced in 
National League of Cities though the extent to which National 
League of Cities should be applied to federal regulation of state 
activities is a subject of continuing uncertainty. 
Although a GVR in light of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
might be appropriate, Hodel stikes me as readily distinguishable 
since the regulation here clearly affects states as states. I 
would deny. 
There is a response. 
6/8/81 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell January 11 1 1982 
From: John Wiley 
No. 80-1925: United Transportation Union v. Long Island RR Co 
Question Presented 
Whether application of the Railway Labor Act to the 
Long Island RR (LIRR) violates National League of Cities. 
I. Discussion 
This case is similar to FERC v. Mississippi (which is 
being argued the day before) because both turn on an interpre-
tation of National League of Cities. With the miracle of mod-
ern word processing 1 I will crib my introductory discussion 
regarding National League of Cities from my FERC bench memo. 
(I do this--at the risk of boring you--both to avoid cumbersome 
cross referencing 1 and because you may read this memo before 
2. 
the FERC bench memo.) 
As stated in the FERC bench memo, the Virginia Surface 
Mining decision from last Term stated that the National League 
of Cities test has four elements: (1) whether a federal stat-
ute regulates "States as States;" (2) whether the federal regu-
lation addresses indisputable "attributes of state 
sovereignty;" (3) whether the federal law directly impairs 
state ability "to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional functions;" and (4) whether--if a federal law of-
fends all three of the foregoing principles of state 
independence--the nature of the federal interest nevertheless 
is such as to justify state submission. (The first three re-
quirements were listed together in text, while the fourth was 
added in a footnote.) 101 s.ct. at 2366 & n.29. 
The Virginia Surface Mining case was decided on the 
first ground: that the strip mining regulations concerned pri-
vate activity rather than "States as States." See, e.g., 101 
S.Ct. at 2369. The Railway Labor Act in this case, however, is 
more like the minimum wage law in National League of Cities, 
because the Railway Labor Act imposes obligations on state em-
ployers (primarily the obligation to permit strikes) in the 
same manner as did the 1974 amendments to the minimum wage act. 
Consequently I have no serious doubt but that the Railway Labor 
Act regulates "States as States." Therefore the LIRR' s chal-
lenge to the federal law satisfies the first element of the 
National League of Cities test--which distinguishes this case 
3 0 
from Virginia Surface Mining. 
As also stated in the FERC memo, the second (indisput-
able attributes of state sovereignty) and third (displacement 
of state ability to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional functions) elements of the National League of Cit-
ies test are difficult for me to differentiate. Again, for 
purposes of this memo, I will assume that the second test does 
not supplement the third test in a way that is material to this 
case. 
Turning then to the third element (displacement of 
state ability to structure integral operations in areas of tra-
ditional functions), it is important to note an initial ambigu-
ity. This third step might in fact represent a single inquiry, 
or it could be two distinct sub-tests. The difference is im-
portant. It depends on whether "integral operations" and "tra-
ditional functions" represent rephrasings of the same notion, 
or whether the two phrases are additive requirements, both of 
which must be satisfied before the Tenth Amendment protects a 
given state action from federal invasion. 
The difference can be illustrated with the hypotheti-
cal used in the FERC bench memo. Suppose California decides to 
embark on a space exploration program. Suppose also that Con-
gress passes a minimum wage law similar to that in National 
League of Cities, except that the law applies only to federal 
and state government space exploration programs. would the 




Yes, if the third test is a single inquiry. National 
League of Cities makes clear that wage determination is an in-
tegral state activity. With only slight semantic difference 
one can also say that it is traditional for states to determine 
their own wage policy. 
But if the third test is a double inquiry, the Tenth 
Amendment would not constrain the application of this federal 
law. As before, National League of Cities establishes that 
wage determination is integral. But this federal usurpation of 
an integral state operation would not displace the state in an 
area of traditional functions--because it is not traditional 
for states to explore space. 
My sense is that the third inquiry should be a two-
pronged test. The language of National League of Cities leads 
me to this conclusion. See 426 u.s. at 851: 
[The 1974 amendments to the wage act will] 
significantly alter or displace the States' 
abilities to structure employe~-employer rela-
tionships in such areas as "'f ire prevention, 
police protection, "'Sanitation, "-public health, 
parks and vfecreation. These activities are 
typical of those performed by ~e an~ local 
governments in discharging their dual --rllnc-
tions or administering the public law and fur-
nishing public services. Indeed, it is func-
tions such as these whi vernments are ere-
( 
ated to provide, s 1ces s as these which 
the States have radi tionall afforded their 
citizens (emphasi added). 
I also think this is wiser of the two possible inter-
pretations. To hold otherwise would permit states to insulate 




have been national matters, simply by establishing programs in 
those fields. A contrary decision also could cut the National 
League of Cities doctrine off from its concern with preserving 
historic state roles. The doctrine instead would focus on the 
general need for protecting state autonomy in any area in which 
a state might chose to become involved. This idea seems to 
accord more with the concept of states in the Articles of Con-
federation than with the notion of states in the present Con-
stitution. 
If you accept the idea of a two part test for the 
third step of the National League of Cities inquiry, the next 
problem is to apply each of these two parts to the present 
problem. The easier issue is whether the Railway Labor Act 
displaces state ability to structure "integral" operations. I 
think the answer to this question must be yes. The essential -
feature of the Railway Labor Act to which the LIRR objects is 
the employees' statutory right to strike. While this right is 
encumbered by waiting periods (that have been increased by the 
Railway Labor Act amendments passed since the CA2 decision), I 
still believe that whether or not to confer the right to strike 
is a basic employer policy choice. It is "integral," in my 
judgment. 
This leaves the second half of the third test: wheth-
er the operation of the LIRR is a "traditional function" of 
state government. This question is the crux of this case. Its 
resolution will be important from the perspective of precedent. 
56-.s 
6. 
The SG makes five arguments why operation of the LIRR 
is not a "traditional function." First, National League of --Cities reaffirmed the holding in United States v. California, 
297 u.s. 175 (1936), and stated explicitly that "operation of a 
railroad engaged in 'common carriage by rail in interstate com-
merce'" was "not in an area that the States have regarded as 
intergral parts of their governmental activities." 426 u.s. at 
854 n.l8. See also Parden v. Terminal R. Co. , 377 U.S. 18 4 
(1964) (operation of a common carrier railroad in interstate 
commerce by a State constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity 
and consent to a FELA suit in federal court) and California v. 
Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 568 (1957) ("If California, by engaging 
in interstate commerce by rail, subjects itself to the commerce 
power so that Congress can make it conform to federal safety ------
requirements, it also has subjected itself to that power so 
...... -
that Congress can regulate its employment relationships.") 
Second, the federal government has a long history of ~ 
involvement in the regulation of railroads. -------- Third, the history of the LIRR and the behavior of NY 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) in this particular 
litigation belie MTA' s claim that operation of the LIRR is a 
traditional state activity. The LIRR was established in the 
last century, and was ~operated publi: ally until 1~ . And 
the MTA did not take the formal steps of reorganizing the LIRR 










Fourth, of the 17 commuter railroads in the United 
States, only two are publicly owned and operated. 
~----------~,---------------------? Fifth, the LIRR is a link in the national freight and --passenger rail network. 
In reply, resps' do not attempt to argue that states 
historically have operated commuter railroads. The SG there-
fore wins if the "tradi tiona! function" test is cast in his-
torical terms. Resps' argument instead is--as it must be--that 
the content of "tradi tiona! functions" must be determined by 
means other than historical reference. Their proposal is 
phrased in various ways, but it is best captured by their 
statement that National League of Cities "is $~ 
~b'),(. 
triggered by on the particular government,~ 
service at or the length of time dur-~
ing which the State has been involved in its provision." Red 
brief at 19 (emphasis added). See also id. at 20 ("by 1980 
transit service had become overwhelmingly a public function in 
the United States"): id. at 21 ("without public transit, the 
City of New York could not survive as a vital entity"). 
This proposed "public dependence" test plainly is in-
complete. The City of New York also would have a difficult 
time surviving without food or national defense. Yet the for-
mer good is primarily supplied by the private sector (with an 
assist from a federally financed national highway system) , and 
the latter function is the exclusive preserve of the federal 
government. Obviously neither is immune from federal regula-
~·. 
8. 
tion. Resps hint at this incompleteness when they concede, 
"[o] f course, the Constitution does not require that ~ ser-
vice which the State chooses to provide be deemed immune from 
federal commerce regulation." Red brief at 22. 
If this approach is to succeed at all, a key addition-
al element must be added--an element that resps mention only in 
passing. See id. at 24 ("the people of New York have an ex-
traordinary and special need for public transportation, which 
only the State of New York is available to satisfy") (emphasis 
added) • Crucial to any test that defines a state immunity 
against federal regulation for a given state act must be a 
showing--not only that the state act services a need on which 
there is public dependence for governmental action, but also 
that the act will not be supplied by the federal government. 
The most logical reason why the federal government will not 
supply certain services is that the need being serviced is too 
localized for national attention. And the reason why this is a 
crucial part of such a state immunity test is that, without 
such a requirement, National League of Cities could become a 
bar against federal action in areas in which all agree there is 
a need for a national response. 
It would broaden National League of Cities to inter-
pret it in this manner. I have doubts whether such an inter-
pretation would be wise. Certainly it is a more activist ap-
plication of federalism limitations. This reading would not 





state functions ("in areas such as fire prevention, police pro-
tection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation," 
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851) • It also would 
grant states hegemony over new areas of governmental activity--
for instance, perhaps regulation of CATV or other new and de-
veloping "state-sized" technologies. The state entitlement to 
immunity from federal interference would have to be based on a 
judicial determination that a particular social problem was 
confined to the state or local level. As occurs every time 
that constitutional protection is expanded, the role of the 
judiciary would increase, because it would be the duty of 
courts to determine which were "state-" and "local-sized" prob-
lems that, by their nature (and not by their history), would be 
immune from federal regulation. 
I suppose one could write an extended essay on the 
advantages and disadvantages of such general and theoretical 
alternative approaches to a young doctrine like that of Nation-
al League of Cities. I will be happy to offer such an essay if ~ 
you think this helpful. In this memo, however, I will simply 
state my view--which is that an essentially historical test is 
preferable to the resps 1 proposed interpretation. I so con-
~ '----------------------~ elude because a historical analysis articulates National League 
of Cities 1 concern with preserving tradi tiona! state roles at 
the same time it provides a manageable framework for deciding 
cases. I therefore would revers~, for the reasons given by the -
SG on pages 5-6 of this memo. 
•;r ~ 10. 
q ~ wvf).. 
/ 
If you disagree with my view, a more pragmatic diffi-
culty with the resps' approach remains. That difficulty is the 
issue of whether operation of the LIRR in fact is a "state-
sized" social problem for which state sovereignty should be 
guaranteed. Railroad bankruptcy is not an unprecedented prob-
lem. As Amtrack and the Gibbon case (argued in December) make 
apparent, such bankruptcies often have caused a federal rather 
than a state response. Significantly, of course, the railroads 
in those cases definitely were interstate lines, whereas the 
LIRR tracks are completely intrastate. As petr argues, howev-
er, the LIRR remains a part of the natio.nal rail system; it 
provides the only extension that connects Long Island with na-
tionwide passenger and freight service. Although interstate 
freight service is comprises a tiny proportion of LIRR's reve-
nues (4%, according to red LIRR brief at 25), in absolute terms 
the interstate freight car activity is substantial--involving 
120,000 freight cars and two million car miles in 1979. Blue 
brief at 11-12. (We are given no statistics on interstate pas-
senger traffic--presumably suggesting that such traffic is min-
imal.) 
In short, it is not plain that the bankruptcy of the 
LIRR is a problem that calls for a governmental response solely 
from the state level. Due to this fact, this may not be the 
case to expand National League of Cities beyond that the limits 
of a historical approach--even if you are ultimately persuaded 






of the proper constitutional federalism doctrine. 
Finally, if you disagree with my view and believe that 
the LIRR has the better argument up to this point, there re-
mains the fourth step in the National League of Cities test: 
whether the nature of the federal interest is such as to justi-
fy the federal invasion of state sovereignty. The paradigm 
case illustrating this balancing is ~ v. United States, 421 
U.S. 542 (197 5) (upholding application of federal wage-price 
freeze to state governments). I am not persuaded that railroad 
labor problems are of such a national priority as to counte-
nance this unusual federal intrusion upon state sovereignty. 
Similarly, the Railway Labor Act is not a temporary measure 
that will expire once an emergency has passed. In these re-
spects, rail labor strife is a different sort of problem than 
was inflation, and the Railway Labor Act is a different sort of 
law than was the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. If the 
S.G. loses up until this final test, I think he also must fail 
this test as well. 
III. Conclusion 
The National League of Cities test has four elements: 
(1) whether a federal statute regulates "States as States;" (2) 
whether the federal regulation addresses indisputable 
"attributes of state sovereignty;" ( 3) whether the federal law 
directly impairs state ability "to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional functions;" and ( 4) whether the 
'· 
12. 
nature of the federal interest nevertheless is such as to jus-
tify state submission. 
The first prong of the National League of Cities test, 
as stated by Virginia Surface Mining, is satisfied here because v.lAJ 
l~ ___,.,... '7 - , y-, 
the Railway Labor Act regulates "States as States." f1:J'"" ·~~ 
~ .1 
The second and third prongs of the test should, in my ~ 
view, be understood as inquiring, first, whether the challenged 
federal regulation displaces an "integral operation" of state 
government, and second, whether this occupation occurs in a 
"traditional function" of state government. Because decision 
about the right to public employees to strike is very similar 
to decisions about minimum wages for public employees, I think ~ ~ 
h · d1' splacesA~b~- 1 "' t ere 1s no question but that the Railway Labor Act ~· 
~J an "integral operation" of state government. 
~
The crux of this case is whether running 
---=-"traditional function" of state government. -----
the LIRR is a 
The SG makes 
strong arguments that rail operation is not a tradition state 
function as a historical matter. If this is how this prong of 
the third test is to be understood--and I think it should be so 
understood--then these arguments are conclusive and the case 
should be reversed. 
Resps argue that the LIRR performs a vi tal function 
for NYC. If this prong of the third test is to respond to this 
argument, the Court must add the requirement that the given 
activity is one that only a state or local government will sup-
~· There is some doubt whether operation of the LIRR is in-
•' ., 
., 
deed such an activity, because operation of the LIRR does im-
plicate national interests. But the Co~rt could hold for the 
LIRR on these grounds if it were willing to adopt a fairly ac-
tivist version of the National League of Cities doctrine. 
Finally, if the LIRR prevails to this point, it should 
win the whole case. The fourth National League of Cities test 
does not pose a insuperable barrier; the federal interests be-
hind the Railway Labor Act do not outweigh state sovereignty 
interests in the manner of the wage freeze in KE.Y_ v. United 
States. 
. . . 
--~-----~-~-----~---.--- -- ~--- -
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From: The Chief Justice 
Ciroulated: ~AR __ J. _2 1!:182_._ 
Recirculated · .... __ 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1925 
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, PETITIONER v. 
LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[March-, 1982] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tenth Amend-
ment prohibits application of the Railway Labor Act to a 
state-owned railroad engaged in i~terstate commerce. 
I 
The Long Island Rail Road, incorporated in 1834, provides 
both freight and passenger service to Long Island. 1 In 
1966, after 132 years of private ownership and a period of 
steadily growing operating deficits, the railroad was acquired 
by New York State through the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority. 
' The railroad's western terminus is Pennsylvania Station in 
Mannhattan; there it connects with lines of railroads which serve other 
parts of the country. The eastern terminus is at Montauk Point, at the tip 
of Long Island, but most of its main and branch line traffic originates in the 
western half of Long Island, in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, and 
in the suburbs of Nassau and western Suffolk counties. By far the bulk of 
the railroad's business is carrying commuters between Long Island's sub-
urban communities and their places of employment in New York City. 
However, the Railroad supplies Long Island's only freight service; it does a 





2 TRANSPORTATION UNION v. LONG ISLAND R.R. CO. 
Thereafter, the Railroad continued to conduct collective 
bargaining pursuant to the procedures of the Railway Labor 
Act. 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The United Transportation 
Union, petitioner in this case, represents the Railroad's con-
ductors, brakemen, switchmen, firemen, motormen, collec-
tors and related train crew employees. In 1978, the Union 
notified the Railroad that it desired to commence negotia-
tions and the parties began collective bargaining as provided 
by the Act. They failed to reach agreement during prelimi-
nary negotiations and, in April, 1979, the Railroad and the 
Union jointly petitioned the National Mediation Board for as-
sistance. Seven months of mediation efforts by the Board 
failed to produce agreement, however, and the Board re-
leased the case from mediation. This triggered a 30-day 
cooling-off period under the Act; absent Presidential inter-
vention, the Act permits the parties to resort to economic 
weapons, including strikes, upon the expiration of the cool-
ing-off period. 
The Union apparently thought the State was considering a 
challenge to the applicability of the Act to the Railroad and 
on December 7, one day before the expiration of the 30-day 
cooling-off period, it sued in federal court seeking a declara-
tory jud·gment that the dispute was covered by the Railway 
Labor Act and not the Taylor Law, New York's law govern-
ing public employee collective bargaining and prohibiting 
strikes by public employees. 2 The next day, the Union com-
menced what was to be a brief strike. Pursuant to the Act, 
the President of the United States intervened on December 
14, thus imposing an additional 60-day cooling-off period 
2 0n January 17, 1980, the Railroad responded to the Union's suit for 
declaratory judgment by asserting that no justiciable controversy existed 
because the railroad did not believe the Taylor Law applied and therefore 
had no intention to invoke its provisions. 
·~. 
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which was to expire on February 13, 1980.3 A few days be-
fore the expiration of the 60-day period, the State converted 
the Railroad from a private stock corporation to a public ben-
efit corporation, apparently believing that the change would 
eliminate Railway Labor Act coverage and bring the employ-
ees under the umbrella of the Taylor Law. 
The Railroad then filed suit in state court on February 13 
seeking to enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law. 
Before the state court acted, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York heard and de-
cided the Union's suit for declaratory relief, holding that the 
Railroad was a carrier subject to the Railway Labor Act, that 
the Act, rather than the Taylor Law, was applicable, and 
that declaratory relief was in order. United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. R., 509 F. Supp. 1300 (EDNY 
1980). 
In a footnote the District Court rejected the argument now 
presented to this Court that application of the Act to the 
state-owned railroad was inconsistent with National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). 509 F. Supp., at 
1306, n. 4. The District Court noted that in National 
League of Cities, the Supreme Court "specifically held that 
operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an inte-
gral part of government activity" and affirmed the rulings in 
California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), and United States 
v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), which held that the Rail-
way Labor Act and the Safety Appliance Act could be applied 
to state-owned railroads. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the operation 
of the Long Island Railroad was an integral government 
function and that the federal Act displaced "essential govern-
mental decisions" involving that function. United Transpor-
3 The Presidential intervention also triggered the creation of a Presiden-
tial Emergency Board to investigate and report on the matter. 
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tation Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F. 2d 19 (CA2 1980). 
The court applied a balancing approach and held that the 
State interest in controlling the operation of its railroad out-
weighed the federal interest in having the Act apply. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1980), and we 
reverse. 
II 
There can be no serious question that, as both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals held, the Long Island Rail-
road is subject to the terms of the Railway Labor Act 4, or 
that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the plenary au-
thority to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry in 
general. 5 This dispute concerns the application of this ac-
knowledged congressional authority to a state-owned rail-
road; we must decide whether that application so impairs the 
ability of the state to carry out its constitutionally-preserved 
sovereign function as to come into conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment. 6 
'The Railroad acknowledges in its brief that the Long Island's freight 
service, which is admittedly engaged in interstate commerce, "eliminat[es] 
any dispute regarding its coverage by the RLA." Brief for the Respon-
dents, at 23. 
In the Court of Appeals, the Railroad maintained that Congress did not 
intend the Act to apply to state-owned passenger railroads. 634 F. 2d, at 
23. Whatever merit that claim may have had, it is no longer tenable. Af-
ter that court rendered its decision, Congress amended the Act to add sec-
tion 9a, 45 U. S. C. § 159a. Section 9a establishes special procedures to be 
applied to any dispute "between a publicly funded and publicly operated 
carrier providing rail commuter service ... and its employees." 
•see Texas & N.O.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 
281 u. s. 548 (1930). 
6 The Tenth Amendment provides: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by The Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people. 
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A 
The Railroad claims immunity from the Railway Labor 
Act, relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 
where we held that Congress could not impose the require-
ments of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and local 
governments. 7 That Act generally requires covered em-
ployers to pay employees no less than a minimum hourly 
wage and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular 
hourly rate for all time worked in any workweek in excess of 
forty hours. Prior to 197 4, the Act excluded most govern-
mental employers. However in that year Congress 
amended the law to extend, in somewhat modified form, its 
provisions to "public agencies," including state governments 
and their political subdivisions.8 We held that the 1974 
Amendments were invalid "insofar as [they] operate to di-
rectly displace the States' freedom to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions. . . . " 
426 U. S., at 852. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Only recently we had occasion to apply the National 
League of Cities doctrine in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Association, Inc.,-- U. S. -- (1981). 
In holding that the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 
1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201, et seq., did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment by usurping State authority over land-use regu-
lations, we set out a three-prong test to be applied in evaluat-
ing claims under National League of Cities: 
"[l]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional com-
merce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of 
National League of Cities must satisfy each of three re-
quirements. First, there must be a showing that the 
challenged regulation regulates the 'States as States.' 
7 The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. 
8 88 Stat. 55 (1974). The 1974 amendments modified several of the defi-
nitions contained in 29 U. S. C. § 203. 
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I d., at 854. Second, the federal regulation must address 
matters that are indisputably 'attributes of state sover-
eignty.' !d., at 845. And third, it must be apparent 
that the States' compliance with the federal law would 
directly impair their ability 'to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional functions.' I d., at 852." 9 
The key prong of the National League of Cities test appli-
cable to this case is the third one, which examines whether 
"the States' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas 
of traditional functions.'" 
B 
The determination of whether a federal law impairs a 
State's authority with respect to "areas of traditional [State] 
functions" may at times be a difficult one. In this case, how-
ever, we do not write on a clean slate. As the District Court 
noted, in National League of Cities, we explicitly reaffirmed 
our holding in United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 
(1936), and in two other cases involving federal regulation of 
railroads: 10 
"The holding of United States v. California ... is quite 
consistent with our holding today. There California's 
activity to which the congressional command was di-
rected was not in an area that the states have regarded 
as integral parts of their governmental activities. It 
was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged 
in 'common carriage by rail in interstate commerce. . . . ' 
297 U. S., at 182." 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18. 
9 However, even if these three requirements are met, the federal stat-
ute is not automatically unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendement. 
The federal interest may still be so great as to "justifly] State submis-
sion." Ibid, at-, n. 29. Cf., Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946). 
10 Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964); California v. Tay-
lor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957). 
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It is thus clear that operation of a railroad engaged in inter-
state commerce is not an integral part of traditional state ac-
tivities generally immune from federal interference under 
National League of Cities. See also Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 422-424 (1978) (concurring 
opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE). 11 The Long Island is con-
cededly a railroad engaged in interstate commerce. 
The Court of Appeals distinguished the three railroad 
cases discussed in National League of Cities, noting that 
they dealt with freight carriers rather than primarily passen-
ger railroads such as the Long Island. That distinction does 
not warrant a different result, however. Operation of pas-
senger railroads, no less than operation of freight railroads, 
has traditionally been a function of private industry, not state 
or local governments. 12 It is certainly true that some passen-
ger railroads have come under government control in recent 
years, as have several freight lines, but that does not alter 
""[T]here [is] certainly no question that a State's operation of a common 
carrier, even without profit and as a 'public function,' would be subject to 
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause .... 
. . . The National League of Cities opinion focused its delineation of the 
'attributes of sovereignty' ... on a determination as to whether the State's 
interest involved 'functions essential to separate and independent exis-
tence.' Ibid., quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911). It 
should be evident, I would think, that the running of a business enterprise 
is not an integral operation in the area of traditional government functions. 
. . . Indeed, the reaffirmance of the holding in United States v. Califor-
nia, supra, by National League of Cities, supra, at 854, n. 18, strongly 
supports this understanding." Ibid., at 422-424 (CHIEF JUSTICE BuR-
GER, concurring). 
12 At the time of this suit, there were 17 commuter railroads in the 
United States; only two of those railroads were publicly owned and oper-
ated, both by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. American Pub-
lic Transit Association, Transit Fact Book 74-75 (1979). Those two public 
railroads the long Island and the Staten Island were originally private 
reilroads. The Staten Island was founded in 1899 and acquired by the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 1971. Moody's Transportation 
Manual 97 (1979). 
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the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not 
among the functions traditionally performed by State and lo-
cal governments. Federal regulation of state-owned rail-
roads simply does not impair a State's ability to function as a 
State. 
III 
In concluding that the operation of a passenger railroad is 
not among those governmental functions generally immune 
from federal regulation under National League of Cities, we 
are not merely following dicta of that decision or looking only 
to the past to determine what is "traditional." In essence, 
National League of Cities held that under most circum-
stances federal power to regulate commerce could not be ex-
ercised in such a manner as to undermine the role of the 
States in our federal system. This Court's emphasis on tra-
ditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of 
state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical 
view of state functions generally immune from federal regula-
tion. Rather it was meant to require an inquiry into 
whether the federal regulation affects basic State preroga-
tives in such a way as would be likely to hamper the state 
government's ability to fulfill its role in the Union and endan-
ger its "separate and independent existence." Ibid, at 851. 
Just as the federal government cannot usurp traditional 
state functions, there is no justification for a rule which 
would allow the States, by acquiring functions previously 
performed by the private sector, to erode federal authority in 
areas traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation. 
Railroads have been subject to comprehensive federal regula-
tion for nearly a century. 13 The Interstate Commerce Act-
13 The initial exercise of the federal authority over railroads occurred be-
fore the completion of the first transcontinental railroad. See the Pacific 
Railroad Act of 1862. 12 Stat. 489. Of course, federal regulation of inter-
state transportation goes back many more years than that. See the 1793 
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the first comprehensive federal regulation of the industry-
was passed in 1887. 14 A year earlier we had held that only 
the federal government, not the states, could regulate the in-
terstate rates of railroads. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illi-
nois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886). The first federal statute dealing 
with railroad labor relations was the Arbitration Act of 
1888;15 the provisions of that Act were invoked by President 
Cleveland in reaction to the Pullman strike of 1894. Federal 
mediation of railroad labor disputes was first provided by the 
Erdman Act of 1898 16 and strengthened by the N ewlands Act 
of 1913.17 In 1916, Congress mandated the eight-hour-day in 
the railroad industry. 18 After federal operation of the rail-
roads during World War I, Congress passed the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920, 19 which further enhanced federal involve-
ment in railroad labor relations. Finally, in 1926, Congress 
passed the Railway Labor Act, which was jointly drafted by 
representatives of the railroads and the railroad unions. 2Q 
Act regulating coastal trade discussed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 
(1824). 
14 24 Stat. 379. 
15 25 Stat. 501. 
16 30 Stat. 424. 
" 38 Stat. 103. 
18 Adamson Act of 1916, 30 Stat. 721. 
19 41 Stat. 456. 
20 Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577. 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 
The purposes of the Railway Labor Act are set out in Section 2 of the Act, 
45 U. S. C. § 151a: 
"The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to com-
merce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any 
limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a 
condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a 
labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers 
and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the 
pruposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settle-
ment of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; 
(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing 
out of greivances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements 
Sa-1925--0PINION 
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The Act has been amended a number of times since 1926, but 
its basic structure has remained intact. The Railway Labor 
Act thus has provided the framework for collective bargain-
ing between all interstate railroads and their employees for 
the past 56 years. There is no similar history of longstand-
ing State regulation of railroad collective bargaining or of 
other aspects of the railroad industry. 
Moreover, the federal government has determined that a 
uniform regulatory scheme is necessary to the operation of 
the national rail system. In particular, Congress long ago 
concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor relations is 
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential 
to the national economy. A disruption of service on any por-
tion of the interstate railroad system can cause serious prob-
lems throughout the system. Congress determined that the 
most effective means of preventing such disruptions is by 
way of requiring and facilitating free collective bargaining be-
tween railroads and the labor organizations representing 
their employees. Rather than absolutely prohibiting 
strikes, Congress decided to assure equitable settlement of 
railroad labor disputes, and thus prevent interruption of rail 
service, by providing mediation and imposing cooling-off pe-
riods, thus creating "an almost interminable" collective bar-
gaining process. Detroit & T. S. L. R.R. v. United Trans-
portation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 149 (1969). "[T]he 
procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, 
based on the hope that reason and practical considerations 
will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute." 
Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E. 
C. R.Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966). 21 To allow individual 
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 
21 Under the recent amendments to the Act, adding a new Section 9a, 45 
U. S. C. § 159a, the process has been made even more "long and drawn 
out" insofar as it applies to publicly-owned commuter rail lines such as the 
Long Island. The law now provides for a "cooling-off period" of up to 240 
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States, by acquiring railroads, to countermand the federal 
system of railroad bargaining, or any of the other elements of 
federal regulation of railroads, would destroy the uniformity 
thought essential by Congress and would endanger the effi-
cient operation of the interstate rail system. 
In addition, a State acquiring a railroad does so knowing 
that the railroad is subject to this longstanding and compre-
hensive scheme of federal regulation of its operations and its 
labor relations. See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 568 
(1957). It is particularly clear in the present case that the 
State acquired the railroad with full awareness that it was 
subject to federal regulation under the Railway Labor Act. 
At the time of the acquisition, a spokesman stated: 
"We just have a new owner and a new board of direc-
tors. We're under the Railway Labor Act, just as we've 
always been. The people do not become state employes, 
they remain railroad employes and retain all the benefits 
and drawbacks of that." 
The parties proceeded along those premises for the next thir-
teen years, with both sides making use of the procedures 
available under the Railway Labor Act, and with Railroad 
employees covered by the Railroad Retirement Act, the Rail-
road Unemployment Insurance Act and the Federal Employ-
days after failure of mediation. Any party to the dispute, or the Governor 
of any State through which the rail service operates, may request appoint-
ment of a Presidential Emergency Board to investigate and report on the 
dispute. If the dispute is not settled within 60 days after creation of the 
Emergency Board, the National Mediation Board must hold a public hear-
ing at which each party must appear and explain any refusal to accept the 
Emergency Board's recommendations. The law then requires appoint-
ment of a second Emergency Board at the request of any party or Gover-
nor of an affected State. That Emergency Board must examine the final 
offers submitted by each party and must determine which is the most rea-
sonable. Finally, if a work stoppage occurs, substantial penalties are pro-
vided against the party refusing to accept the offer determined by the 
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ers' Liability Act. Conversely, Railroad employees were 
not eligible for any of the retirement, insurance or job secu-
rity benefits of New York civil servants. 
There is thus strong evidence not only that the State knew 
of and accepted the federal regulation, but also that it was 
able to operate under federal regulation without any notice-
able impairment of its traditional sovereignty. Indeed, the 
State's initial response to this suit was to acknowledge that 
the Railway Labor Act applied. It can thus hardly be main-
tained that imposition of the Act on the State's operation of 
the Railroad is likely to impair the State's ability to fulfill its 
role in the Union or to endanger the "separate and indepen-
dent existence" referred to in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, supra, at 851. 
IV 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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